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Recent events concerning two automakers — GM and GAZ — underscore the difference in the U.S. 
and Russian governments’ approaches to dealing with the economic crisis.  
The U.S. government acted decisively. The previous GM owners were replaced, creditors received as 
much compensation as was possible under the circumstances, and last week the giant automaker
emerged from bankruptcy proceedings. Freed of more than two-thirds of its former debt load, the 
company now has a fighting chance in today’s difficult automobile market.  
The Russian government, however, could not even carry out the first step in restructuring GAZ —
removing Oleg Deripaska as the owner of the company. In addition, rather than writing off its debts,
the firm was granted state guarantees on new debt. 
When a company cannot meet its debt obligations and the owner is not replaced, this is always a
recipe for disaster. In an economy that is functioning properly, ownership of such companies is
transferred to either its creditors or to someone who can settle the demands of the company’s
creditors. The new owner then decides the fate of the company’s managers; in some circumstances,
it may choose to retain them.  
But this approach is unworkable for state-owned businesses because they almost always have
access to budgetary funds to pay off their creditors. In this situation, managers are always less
motivated to restructure, and this is precisely why the granting of additional funds to state-owned 
businesses should always be accompanied by a sweeping reorganization of its top management.
Without following that simple rule, the provision of state guarantees is, in effect, an even more
ineffective form of support than subsidies. After receiving subsidies, managers have some form of
stimulus to restructure their operations, but state guarantees are a direct invitation for a company to
continue the status quo — that is, continue getting involved in the kind of unjustifiably risky projects
that got them into trouble in the first place. 
It requires a lot of political willpower by a country’s leaders to compensate creditors and redistribute
ownership of a failing state company. Dealing with politically vital enterprises that have gone bankrupt
is no easy task for any government. The U.S. administration used all of its leverage to force GM 
creditors to agree to the terms of restructuring.  
In Russia, the government’s policy toward bankrupt companies has been based not on what is best
for the economy, but according to what connections the company owner has with the ruling elite. GAZ 
and AvtoVaz, which received enormous federal funds to prop them up, are vivid examples of
government inefficiency and incompetence.  
Since a significant part of the world economy is in recession, Russia’s economic slump — although 
one of world’s worst — is not drawing a great deal of attention. But as soon as other countries that
have efficient government institutions begin to pull out of the crisis, it will become clear that Russians
should  have demanded a lot more from their government. 
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